

Affirmative – A2: China CP

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Frontline

Perm do both – US-China ocean cooperation feasible and mutually beneficial

Department of State 12

{“U.S.-China Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Office of the Spokesperson, 7/12,
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194891.htm#THUR>}

On the occasion of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the United States and China underscored the **benefits to the United States and China, the Asia-Pacific region, and the international community** of building a U.S.-China cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit and fostering a new type of relationship between major countries. Toward this end, through regular and substantive dialogue and consultation, the United States and China are developing **cooperative activities** throughout the Asia-Pacific region. At this year’s ARF, the two countries pledged to **enhance and initiate collaborative efforts** in the region, including in the areas of science and technology, climate change, disaster warning and response, energy policy, forest management, fisheries management, disease detection and control, and wildlife protection and conservation. Recent **accomplishments** in U.S.-China cooperation in the Asia-Pacific include: Disaster relief: The United States and China co-hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum Seminar on the Laws and Regulations on Participation in International Disaster Relief by Armed Forces in Beijing, June 10-12, 2012. Disaster response: The United States and China jointly funded and participated in an urban search and rescue (USAR) training exercise aimed at improving USAR capacity of Indonesia and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) Asia Pacific Regional Earthquake Response Exercise, jointly funded by USAID and the China Earthquake Administration, was hosted by the Government of Indonesia National Search and Rescue Agency and held in Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia, May 29-June 1, 2012. Disaster warning: The United States and China decided to sign a Letter of Intent for a Collaborative Oceanographic Scientific Research Pilot Project for the Development of South Sea Real-Time Tsunami Forecasting Capabilities between the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and China’s National Marine Environmental Forecasting Center in the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). Science and technology: The United States and China signed the Framework Plan for Ocean and Fishery Science and Technology Cooperation between NOAA and SOA. Climate change: The United States and China are developing the Indian Ocean Southern Climate Observation, Reanalysis, and Prediction (ISOCORE) Program. Energy policy: The United States and China are participating as partners in the Asia-Pacific Energy Regulatory Forum (APERF) to facilitate sharing of information on energy regulatory and policy practice and experience in the Asia-Pacific Region, with China to attend the U.S.-hosted APERF meeting in Washington, D.C., in August 2012. Wildlife protection: The United States and China participated in a Special Investigations Group meeting led by the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN) in Nanning, China, in June 2012. Forest management: The United States and China are strengthening cooperation and exchange through the Asia-Pacific Network for Sustainable Forest Management and Rehabilitation (APFnet). Wildlife conservation: The United States and China are collaborating on wild tiger conservation, including in the Asia-Pacific. Disease detection and control: The United States and China intend to expand collaboration between the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and China’s CDC to strengthen disease detection and control capabilities and networks in the Asia-Pacific. Fisheries management: The United States and China reaffirmed their commitment to expand **cooperation on fisheries management** and jointly support the creation of the North Pacific Fisheries Commission.

China’s too poor for the plan – no cash

Evans-Pritchard 13

{Ambrose, International Business Editor, syndicated columnist on world politics and economics for 30 years, “China’s Soaring Fiscal Deficit Rings Alarm Bells,” The Telegraph, 10/15,
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/10380937/Chinas-soaring-fiscal-deficit-rings-alarm-bells.html#THUR>}

Borrowing by all levels of the Chinese government has **soared to unprecedented levels** and is now **one of the highest in the world**, vastly complicating efforts by Beijing’s new leadership to keep growth on track. Data from the International Monetary Fund shows that China’s budget deficit reached 9.7pc of GDP last year if regional spending is included and one-off land sales are stripped out. This is **higher than previously thought and above levels in the US, India, or Southern Europe’s debt-stricken crisis states**. Zhiwei Zhang from Nomura said it is **disturbing** that “massive stimulus” on this scale has not stopped China’s growth rate has slowing sharply since 2010,

describing the latest rebound has “**unhealthy**” and likely to wither over coming months as Beijing is forced to tighten policy. “The economic recovery is unsustainable,” he said. Analysts have long assumed that China’s authorities retain plenty of fiscal firepower if needed to keep the expansion going as they clamp down on dangerous levels of credit, **but Beijing may already have exhausted any further scope for budget stimulus**. Fitch Ratings warns that the pace of loan growth over the last five years takes China into **uncharted waters**, with debt jumping from \$9 trillion to \$23 trillion, or 200pc of GDP. The economic “efficiency” of debt **has collapsed**. Each extra yuan of debt now yields just 0.18 yuan of GDP growth. Mark Williams from Capital Economics said the growth spurt over recent months has mostly been driven by “heavy, state-led industry”, a sign that the new leadership is still clinging to its outdated growth model. “Without continued policy support, we doubt that the rebound will be sustained,” he said. There are already signs that money growth is flagging. Simon Ward at Henderson Global Investors says a **key gauge** of the money supply -- six-month real M1 -- **has slowed sharply** over the late summer and is near levels that set off the last “**hard-landing**” scare. The measure gives an early warning for the economy roughly six months ahead. “Chinese September money numbers **cast doubt** on hopes that the economy is regaining momentum,” he said. China’s central bank is taking extreme measures to hold down the exchange rate to prevent a further loss of export competitiveness, especially against Japan. Capital Economics estimates that Beijing bought \$70bn of foreign bonds last month in a “frantic” bid to stop the yuan rising.

China is a terrible actor – can’t solve and US is comparatively better

Haiqing 13

{Tao, DO Editor, “Establish China's Marine Economy Development Systems,” 11/6,
http://en.theorychina.org/xsqy_2477/201306/t20130611_270465.shtml}

But as to the present situation, China's existing marine management system **lacks integrated management**. The fragmented phenomenon in China's marine economy development is serious, such as the Bohai Bay, with 5800 km coastline and over 60 ports, owning a port on average less than 100 kilometers. Isomorphism causes regional repeat construction and **significant** waste of resources. Therefore, China should establish Special Coordination Committee in charge of the marine economy at the level of Central Government, intensify and draft the marine economic development plan covering all industries and regions, in order to improve the ability of marine resources exploitation, to break the region separation, so that the development of marine economy in all regions will promote in harmony, forming a new pattern of ocean management. Establish the legal protection system and publish the Basic Law of the Ocean As the world's economic center is now transferring to the Pacific, coastal states have set marine strategies and policies. Canada in 1996, the United States in 2000, and Japan in 2007, issued their National Marine Basic Law to protect its own interests. The United States comprehensive ocean legislation system has been in a leading position in the field of the world's oceans. In 2000, the U.S. Congress passed the Marine Act 2000, set up an ocean policy assessment committee to reconsider and formulate U.S. ocean policy. In 2004, the U.S. National Ocean Policy Committee submitted 21st Century Ocean Blueprint report, which made by far the most thorough assessment of U.S. ocean policy and depicting the new blueprint for the U.S. maritime industry and development in the 21st century. Subsequently, the United States released the U.S. Ocean Action Plan to put forward specific measures to implement the blueprint. Looking back at China, under The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other relevant laws, China has jurisdiction over more than 3 million square kilometers of ocean. In the Declaration on the Territorial Sea promulgated in 1958, China issued over 80 ocean-related laws and regulations for 50 years, **but China still lack the basic principles throughout the entire marine legal system**. Overall, China has no one similar to Japan's Basic Law of the Ocean, to the disadvantage of managing national marine affairs and safeguarding national maritime rights and interests. Wang Zhenmin, dean of Tsinghua University Law School, said that the research foundation of the current domestic marine law is weak and the talents are short. The future international competitions, whether on land or sea, will eventually be solved by legal forms.

Affirmative – A2: Influence DA

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Frontline

Alt causes to China heg – historical suspicion, immigration, trade issues, Central Asian competition, bad M.E. policy, human rights, general suspicion of ruse, hacking, resource adventurism

Shambaugh 13

[David Shambaugh, a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, Falling Out of Love With China, 3/19/13, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/opinion/falling-out-of-love-with-china.html>]

While pockets of positive views regarding China can be found around the world, public opinion surveys from the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project and the BBC reveal that China's image ranges between mixed and poor. And the negative view is expanding: for almost a decade, European public opinion toward China has been the most negative in the world, but that is now matched in America and Asia. There are likewise increasing signs of strain with Russia: on the surface, there is considerable harmony of worldviews and interests, but underneath lie lingering historical suspicions, growing trade frictions, problems stemming from Russia's military sales to China, immigration controversies and nascent strategic competition in Central Asia. China's reputation has also deteriorated in the Middle East and among the Arab League due to the country's support for the Syrian and Iranian regimes as well as its persecution of Muslim minorities in far western China, a policy that has also sullied its image in Central Asia. Even in Africa — where relations remain positive on the whole — China's image has deteriorated over the past three years as a result of the flood of Chinese entrepreneurs, its rapacious extraction of oil and other raw materials, aid projects that seem to benefit Chinese construction companies as much as recipient countries and support for unsavory governments. A similar downturn is apparent in Latin America for the same reasons. Finally, China's most important relationship — with the United States — is also troubled. It is now a combination of tight interdependence, occasional cooperation, growing competition and deepening distrust. For both sides, the critical question is how to manage an increasingly competitive and distrustful relationship without its becoming a full-blown adversarial relationship. Neither country has any experience handling such strategic competition amid deep interdependence, although we can hope that the latter feature will buffer the former. While the decline in China's image may be global, the reasons differ from region to region. China's huge trade surpluses have contributed directly and indirectly to job losses around the world, but the impact on its image has been most pronounced in Europe, Latin America and the United States, where China seems to loom as an unprecedented economic threat. Meanwhile, China's military modernization and regional muscle-flexing in Asia has tarnished its reputation among its neighbors. Its unprecedented cyber-hacking has skyrocketed to the top of the agenda of Sino-American relations in recent weeks, while China's domestic human rights situation has been a long-standing concern in the West. Underlying many of these complaints are China's authoritarian political system and its business practices, which are opaque and riddled with corruption. While trying to broaden their global operations, China's multinational corporations often encounter substantial difficulties establishing themselves abroad and gaining global market share. China does not have a single corporate brand listed in the top 100 of the annual Businessweek/Interbrand global rankings of respected corporate brands. Given China's growth rates, its image might not seem to matter much. But it does. As a result of China's declining image, its new president, Xi Jinping, and his new foreign policy team face mounting foreign policy difficulties and challenges, both perceptually and substantively. Mounting suspicions and growing frictions are part and parcel of being a global power. But China would be better advised to substantively engage foreign criticisms than to reflexively dismiss them or respond with unconvincing public-relations campaigns. There are any number of immediate steps China could take. It should work to halt its hacking. It should open its markets and reduce its trade surpluses, while restricting subsidies to its foreign investment and exports. It should protect intellectual property rights and ratify and adhere to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which commits its members to protect individual liberties. In foreign policy, it should involve itself in multinational negotiations under the Law of the Sea Treaty to resolve its disputes in the South China Sea, negotiate a settlement with

Japan over its disputed islands and pressure North Korea and Iran to end their nuclear programs. It should also be transparent in its overseas aid programs and military budgets, and it should better respect sensitivities in developing countries over China's extraction of natural resources. Taking such steps would go much further toward enhancing China's international image than the billions of dollars the country is currently pumping into its overseas propaganda efforts.

They trade-off with US Heg, which prevents multiple extinction scenarios – they cause war

Art 12

[Dr. Robert J., Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, May 2012, "America's Path Grand Strategy for the Next Administration" Center for New American Security http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AmericasPath_FontaineAndLord.pdf]

Why are these national interests crucial to **the United States**? Clearly, the country **must do all it can to protect** the homeland from attack – the prime directive of any grand strategy – especially from a **WMD attack by a terrorist group or a** devastating state-sponsored **cyber attack**. It is also in America's interest to **preserve** as deep a **peace** as possible among the great **Eurasian powers** because **any war among them would be deeply destabilizing and costly and would risk drawing in the United States in one way or another. The United States also has a vested interest in avoiding intense security competitions among these states because such competitions could lead those states to acquire WMD**. Assured access to oil supplies for air, sea and land transportation is essential to the **global economy** until the world can wean itself off its heavy dependence on oil for transportation, something that is going to take decades, even with the greater push to switch to renewable energy sources. ¹¹ **An open economic order contributes to U.S. prosperity, but it also contributes to global economic growth and prosperity, both of which help promote peace. Spreading democracy** and the rule of law within states will make for a more peaceful and prosperous world and **will also lessen the need for costly military interventions** because democracies are less likely than nondemocracies to commit human rights abuses against their own populaces. Finally, **averting severe climate change** is in the best interest of the United States because of the risks involved in kicking the earth into a new, irreversible and adverse climatic state (even though under moderate climatechange scenarios, the United States will suffer less than developing states and many of the other great powers). After presenting these national interests, I **proposed that a forward defense posture** – retaining America's key alliances and deploying American troops abroad, both onshore and afloat in three key regions (East Asia, the Middle East and Europe) – **would better realize and protect these interests than would a grand strategy of isolationism or offshore balancing**, both of which entail America ending its military alliances and bringing its troops home. In my usage, both isolationism and offshore balancing are strategies in which the United States would have no standing military commitments in peacetime to defend other states and no forward bases abroad. ¹² The U.S. Navy might steam the seven seas, but all other U.S. troops would be at home, and there would be no standing military alliances or permanent overseas military bases. ¹³ Forward defense requires bases abroad and allies. Therefore, selective engagement argues for retaining key American alliances, not only because they enable **a forward defense posture** but also because they are tools of political management and **enhance cooperative solutions to regional security issues**. In this view, key alliances retain enduring value. They ensure U.S. access to overseas bases where needed, facilitate joint training in peacetime (and, consequently, joint operations in wartime), promote transparency and a more open security dialogue, and help to structure expectations and develop shared attitudes about problem solving. **Standing alliances** clearly experience difficulties and conflicts among their members, but they **are** generally more **reliable tools for projecting power into key regions** than are ad hoc, informal arrangements (although those can also be useful under certain conditions). I favor an **in-theater military presence**, either afloat or onshore because, in my view, America's regional **alliances retain greater credibility – and are therefore stronger for reassurance and deterrence purposes – with some U.S. forces in a region than with U.S. military guarantees but no forces in the region. Credibility** is a function of will and capability. In-theater forces enhance capability but are probably more important for **what they signify about will**. Such **forces are tangible and, therefore, more politically salient** as manifestations of political will **than simple pledges on paper would be**. In-theater forces are akin to actions speaking louder than words. Finally, **the**

United States must continue to provide global leadership. Without such leadership, solutions to global collective action problems – whether they involve security or nonsecurity issues – are unlikely to arise. International politics is still organized around the state model; consequently, states remain the primary, although certainly not the only, actors in world politics. The United States is, and will continue for some time to be, the world’s most powerful state; therefore, its actions and inactions strongly influence whether international initiatives will succeed or fail. If the leader does not lead, things do not get done. By the same token, however, the leader cannot get others to follow unless it takes the interests of allies and other important parties into account when formulating policies and taking action, instead of simply consulting after it has decided on a course of action. Thus, although the United States has to lead, it also has to avoid excessive unilateralism

US/China competition causes a global nuclear war

Farley 14

[Robert, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, “Asia’s Greatest Fear”, 6-9-14, The Nation Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asia-flames-us-china-war-10621>]

A war between the United States and China would transform some aspects of the geopolitics of East Asia, but would also leave many crucial factors unchanged. Tragically, a conflict between China and the US might be remembered only as “The First Sino-American War.” How the War Would Start Fifteen years ago, the only answers to “How would a war between the People’s Republic of China and the United States start?” involved disputes over Taiwan or North Korea. A Taiwanese declaration of independence, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or some similar triggering event would force the PRC and the US reluctantly into war. This has changed. The expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities means that we can envision several different scenarios in which direct military conflict between China and the United States might begin. These still include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea scenario, but now also involve disputes in the

East and South China Seas, as well as potential conflict with India along the Tibetan border. The underlying factors are the growth of Chinese power, Chinese dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance commitments to a variety of regional states. As long as these factors hold, the possibility for war will endure. Whatever the trigger, the war does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack against Chinese fleet, air, and land-based installations. Although the US military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-access assets before they can target US planes, bases, and ships, it is extremely difficult to envisage a scenario in which the United States decides to pay the political costs associated with climbing the ladder of escalation. Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have to wait for Chinese missiles to rain down upon them, but the United States will almost certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military combat before it can begin engaging Chinese forces. If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first strike, or properly prepare to receive a first blow. At the same time, a “bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. Instead, a brewing crisis will steadily escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of steps on the part of the US military that indicate to Beijing that Washington is genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups, shifting deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment, China will need to decide whether to push forward or back down. On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions (the US effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze each others assets, as well as those of any co-belligerents. This will begin the economic pain for capital and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in

industrial production. How do the Allies Respond Whether US allies support American efforts against China depends on how the war begins. If war breaks out over a collapse of the DPRK, the United States can likely count on the support of South Korea and Japan. Any war stemming from disputes in the East China Sea will necessarily involve Japan. If events in the South China Sea lead to war, the US can probably rely on some of the ASEAN states, as well as possibly Japan.

Australia may also support the US over a wide range of potential circumstances. China faces a less complicated situation with respect to allies. Beijing could probably expect benevolent neutrality, including shipments of arms and spares, from Russia, but little more. The primary challenge for Chinese diplomats would be establishing and maintaining the neutrality of potential US allies. This would involve an exceedingly complex dance, including reassurances about Chinese long-term intentions, as well as displays of confidence about the prospects of Chinese victory (which would carry the implicit threat of retribution for support of the United States). North Korea presents an even more difficult problem. Any intervention on the part of the DPRK runs the risk of triggering Japanese and South Korean counter-intervention, and that math doesn’t work out for China. Unless Beijing is certain that Seoul and Tokyo will both throw in for the United States (a doubtful prospect given their hostility to one another), it may spend more time restraining Pyongyang than pushing it into the conflict. War Aims The US will pursue the following war aims: 1. Defeat the affirmative expeditionary purpose of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). 2. Destroy the offensive capability of the PLAN and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). 3. Potentially destabilize the control of the CCP government over mainland China. Except in the case of a war that breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the first task involves either defeating a Chinese attempt to land forces, or preventing the reinforcement and resupply of those troops before forcing their surrender. The second task will require a wide range of attacks against deployed Chinese air and naval units, as well as ships and aircraft held in reserve. We can expect, for example, that the USN and USAF will target Chinese airbases, naval bases, and potentially missile bases in an effort to maximize damage to the PLAN and PLAAF. The third task probably depends on the successful execution of the first two. The defeat of Chinese expeditionary forces, and the destruction of a large percentage of the PLAN and the PLAAF, may cause domestic turmoil in the medium to long term. US military planners would be well-advised to concentrate the strategic campaign on the first two objectives and hope that success has a political effect, rather than roll the dice on a broader “strategic” campaign against CCP political targets. The latter would waste resources, run the risk of escalation, and have unpredictable effects on the Chinese political system. The PLA will pursue these ends: 1. Achieve the affirmative expeditionary purpose. 2. Destroy as much of the expeditionary capability of the USAF and USN as possible. 3. Hurt America badly enough that future US governments will not contemplate intervention. 4. Disrupt the US-led alliance system in East Asia. The first task requires the deployment of PLAN surface forces, possibly in combination with PLAAF airborne forces, to seize an objective. The second (task) involves the use of submarines, aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles to destroy US and allied installations and warships across East Asia. The third and fourth tasks rest upon the second. The PLA will attempt to inflict sufficient casualties on US forces that future US decision-makers will hesitate to use force against the PRC. Similarly, the survival of the US-led alliance system requires that the United States successfully defeat

Chinese aggression; if it cannot, the alliance system could deteriorate and collapse. The United States hasn't lost a fighter in action since the 1999 Kosovo War, and hasn't lost a major warship since World War II. The sinking of a warship would likely also result in the greatest loss of life of any single action for the US military in action since the Vietnam War.

However, both US and Chinese strategists may overestimate US casualty aversion. The loss of a major warship and its crew might serve to solidify US commitment (at least in the short term) rather than undermine it. The "Hold Your Breath" Moments The biggest moment will come when the PLA makes an overt attack against a US aircraft carrier. This represents the most significant possible escalation against the United States short of a nuclear attack. If China decides to attack a US carrier, the war no longer involves posturing and message sending, but rather a full-scale commitment of capabilities designed to defeat and destroy enemy military forces. The means for this attack matters. An attack launched from a ship or a submarine makes any PLAN military vessel fair game for the United States, but doesn't necessarily incur US attacks against PLAAF

airbases, Second Artillery missile installations, or even naval installations. The most dangerous form of attack would involve a ballistic missile volley against a carrier. This is true not simply because these missiles are difficult to intercept, but also because such missiles could carry nuclear warheads. The prospect of a nuclear state using a conventional ballistic missile against another nuclear state, especially one with a presumptive nuclear advantage, is laden with complexity. The next "hold your breath" moment will come when the first US missiles strike Chinese targets. Given the overwhelming nuclear advantage that the United States holds over China, the first wave of US attacks will prove deeply stressful to the PRCs military and civilian leadership. This is particularly the case if the Chinese believe that they can

win at the conventional level of escalation; they will worry that the United States will bump to nuclear in order to retain its advantage.

We can expect that China will deploy its submarines in advance of the onset of hostilities. The surface fleet is a different story, however. In any high intensity combat scenario, the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force will see Chinese warships as legitimate targets for destruction, and will attack with air and subsurface assets. Indeed, even hiding in port probably won't prevent attacks on the PLAN's largest ships, including the carrier Liaoning and the big new amphibious transport docks. China will only sortie the PLAN under two circumstances; if it feels it has sufficient force protection to allow a task force to operate relatively unmolested, or if China's position has become desperate. In either situation, US submarines will pose the most immediate threat to the surface forces. Under most war scenarios, China needs to fight for some affirmative purpose, not simply the destruction of US or Japanese military forces. This means that the PLAN must invade, capture, supply, and defend some geographical point, most likely either Taiwan or an outpost in the East or South China Sea. The PLA will need to establish the conditions under which the PLAN can conduct surface support missions. Who Will Win? The most difficult question to judge is "who will win?" because that question involves assessing a wide variety of unknowns. We don't know how well Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles will function, or how destructive US cyber-attacks against the PLAN will prove, or how dangerous the F-22 Raptor will be to conventional Chinese fighters, or how effectively the different elements of the PLAN will cooperate in actual combat. Finally, we don't know when the war will start; both the PLA and the US military will look much different in 2020 than they do in 2014. However, in general terms the battle will turn on these questions: 1. Electronic Warfare: How

severely will the United States disrupt Chinese communications, electronic, and surveillance capabilities? Attacking US forces will depend on

communication between seers and shooters. To the extent that the US can disrupt this communication, it can defang the PLA. Conversely, Chinese cyber-warfare against the United States could raise the domestic stakes for American policymakers. 2. Missiles vs. Missile Defenses: How well will the USN and USAF be able to defeat Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles? The PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery have a bewildering array of missile options for attacking deployed and deploying US forces in depth. The American capacity to survive the onslaught depends in part on the effectiveness of defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as the ability to strike and destroy launchers within and around China. 3. Joint Operations: How well will the disparate elements of the PLA operate together in context of high intensity, disruptive military operations? Unlike the US military, the PLA has little relevant combat experience from the last three decades. On the flipside, how well will US "Air-Sea Battle" work prepare the USN and the USAF for working together? 4. Quality vs. Quantity: Chinese forces are highly likely to achieve local numerical superiority in some types of assets, primarily aircraft and submarines. The (narrowing) gap between US and Chinese technology and training

will determine how well American forces can survive and prevail in such situations. How the War Would End This war doesn't end with a surrender

signed on a battleship. Instead, it ends with one participant beaten, embittered, and likely preparing for the next round.

The best case scenario for an American victory would be a result akin to the collapse of the Imperial German government at the end of World War I, or the collapse of Leopoldo Galtieri's military government after the Falklands conflict. Humiliating defeat in war, including the destruction of a significant portion of the PLAN and the PLAAF, as well as severe economic distress, could undermine the grip of the CCP on Chinese governance. This is an extremely iffy prospect, however, and the United States shouldn't count on victory leading to a new revolution. What if China wins? China can claim victory by either forcing the United States into an accommodation to US goals, or by removing the alliance framework that motivates and legitimates US action. The United States cannot continue the war if South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines no longer have an interest in fighting. Either of these require doing significant damage to US military forces and, potentially, to the US economy. The impact of a defeat on US domestic politics would be tough to predict. The United States has "lost" wars in the past, but these defeats have generally involved negotiated settlements of areas not particularly critical to US global interests. It's not clear how the US people would interpret a major military defeat at the hands of a peer competitor, especially a peer competitor that continues to grow in military and economic power. The President and political party that led the US into war would

likely suffer dramatically at the polls, at least after the immediate shock of defeat wore off. The biggest diplomatic and political challenge that both countries face will probably be finding a way for the other side to give up while maintaining its

"honor." No one benefits if this war becomes a struggle for regime survival, or for national prestige. How the

Peace Begins The prospect for US conflict with China in the Asia-Pacific depends on a basic appreciation of the changing balance of economic and military power. World War I could not change the fact that Germany would remain the largest and most powerful state in Central Europe. Similarly, war is unlikely to change the long-term trajectory of Chinese growth and assertiveness. A key to peace involves the re-establishment of productive economic relations between China, the United States, and the rest of the Pacific Rim. Regardless of how the war plays out, it will almost certainly disrupt patterns of trade and investment around the world. If either side decides to attack (or, more likely, inter) commercial shipping, the impact could devastate firms and countries that have no direct stake in the war. However, the governments of both the US and China will face strong pressures to facilitate the resumption of full trade relations, at least in consumer goods. China will not find it difficult to reconstruct war losses. Even if the United States effectively annihilates the PLAN and the PLAAF, we can expect that the Chinese shipbuilding and aviation industries will replace most losses within the decade, probably with substantial assistance from Russia. Indeed, significant Chinese war losses could reinvigorate both the Russian shipbuilding and aviation industries. Moreover, the war will, by necessity, "modernize" the PLA and PLAAF by destroying legacy capability. A new fleet of ships and planes will replace the legacy force. War losses to trained personnel will hurt, but the experience gained in combat will produce a new, highly trained and effective corps of personnel. This will lead to better, more realistic training for the next generations of PLA soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Win or lose, the Chinese military will likely be more lethal a decade after the war. The United States may have a harder time replacing losses, and not only because US warships and aircraft cost more than their Chinese counterparts. The production lines for the F-15 and F-16 are near the end, and the US no longer produces F-22. Moreover, US shipbuilding has declined to the point that replacing significant war losses could take a very long time. This might prove particularly problematic if the war demonstrated severe problems with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Given US intention to arm the USAF, USN, and USMC with F-35 variants over the next decade, proof of inadequacy would

wreck force planning for the foreseeable future. The United States will have to face the "was it worth it?" question. In victory or defeat, the US will suffer substantial military and economic damage. Even if the US wins, it will not "solve" the problem of China; even in the unlikely event that the CCP collapses, a successor regime will still dispute China's littoral. Potentially, victory could cement the US-led alliance system, making the containment of China considerably less expensive. Assuming that the war began with an assertive Chinese move in the East or

South China Sea, the United States could plausibly paint China as the aggressor, and establish itself as the focal point for balancing behavior in the region.

Chinese aggression might also spur regional allies (especially Japan) to increase their defense expenditures. A war could invigorate US government and society around the long-term project of containing China. The US could respond by redoubling its efforts to outpace the Chinese military, although this would provoke an arms race that could prove devastating to both sides. However, given the lack of ideological or territorial threats to the United States, this might be a tough sell. Finally, the United States could respond by effectively removing itself from the East Asian political scene, at least in a military sense. This option would be hard for many in the US to swallow, given that generations of American foreign policy-makers have harbored hegemonic ambitions. Conclusion The window for war between the United States and China will, in all likelihood, last for a long time. Preventing war will require tremendous skill and acumen from diplomats and policymakers. Similarly, the demands of positioning either side for victory will continue to tax diplomatic, military, and technological resources for the foreseeable future. At the moment, however, we shouldn't forget that China and the United States constitute the heart of one of the most productive economic regions the world has ever seen. That's something to protect, and to build on.

Impact Defense – ASEAN

ASEAN ineffective—Thai/Cambodian conflict, no enforcement mechanisms, collapse of ASEAN unity inevitable

Busbarat, 11 (Pongphisoot 'Paul' Busbarat – Research Associate in the Department of Political & Social Change in the School of International, Political & Strategic Studies at the Australian National University and former policy analyst at the Bureau of International Security Affairs at the Office of the National Security Council of Thailand, May 20, “Thai-Cambodian conflict: an obstacle to the ASEAN Community 2015?”, East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/20/thai-cambodian-conflict-an-obstacle-to-the-asean-community-2015/>)

The 18th ASEAN Summit held in Jakarta had as its theme ‘ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations.’ But **against** this backdrop of **hopes for increased integration**, the current **Thai-Cambodian** dispute **highlights fundamental problems among ASEAN** member countries.

The conflict has developed within complex political conditions in both countries. Thailand's current domestic situation, however, has been especially aggravating to the relationship as attempts by conservative groups — led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or the Yellow Shirts — to discredit the pro-Thaksin faction has leveraged nationalistic sentiments.

The nationalists attack Thaksin and his allies as ‘selling the nation’, citing the sale of Thaksin's telecom company, Shin Corp, to Singaporean Temasek in 2005 and the Samak government's support of Cambodia's listing of Preah Vihear Temple as a UNESCO World Heritage in 2008. Despite the World Heritage status having nothing to do with any legally binding border demarcation, the PAD has successfully convinced many Thais that the temple's joint listing will lead to the loss of Thai sovereignty over the disputed 4.6 square kilometre area adjacent to the temple. While Prime Minister Abhisit and his Democrat Party supported PAD's nationalist agenda over this issue when in opposition, PAD's manipulation of nationalist attitudes has gone beyond what Abhisit envisaged, resulting in the government's being pressured into adopting hawkish measures against Cambodia.

The military is another important factor in prolonging the armed conflict, as the dispute keeps the military involved in politics and justifies budget increases (including a recent THB1.80 billion (US\$59.3 million) for its operations along the Thai-Cambodian border). The Thai military used to play an important role in Thailand's relations with neighbouring countries but lost this prerogative to the Foreign Ministry in the 1990s following democratisation. With the fall of democracy following the 2006 coup, the military has increasingly reinserted its old role and sometimes taken different stances to the government. Evidence of the military's hand can be seen in the government's decision to renege on its support for Indonesian observers in the disputed area.

How the conflict will be resolved remains uncertain. Thailand prefers bilateral talks, seeing disadvantage in raising the issue at the regional and international levels, although past **bilateral negotiations have been unsuccessful.** ASEAN, under Indonesia's chairmanship, has **tried to offer assistance** on several occasions since February this year, and Thailand has uncomfortably accepted this role. The recent peace deal brokered by Jakarta during the ASEAN Summit brought about the term of reference for both parties to resolve the conflict, including steps of supporting bilateral negotiations and allowing an observer team to monitor the ceasefire. But both countries are presently still playing around with wording and preconditions; and **without good will and concession made by both** toward peace, **ASEAN, not equipped with any enforcement measures, can do little.**

A parallel development is also happening at the ICJ as Cambodia recently submitted a request to the Court to interpret the 1962 border ruling. The conflict may be resolved if both parties accept the new interpretation peacefully. But if the ICJ rules in Cambodia's favour, nationalist sentiment in Thailand will likely intensify, degrading the Thai-Cambodian relationship further. This would also greatly damage Thailand's economic interests, and, from a geostrategic perspective, Thailand would lose its role in mainland Southeast Asia to other regional players, especially increasingly influential China and Vietnam.

The **repercussions of this conflict** at the regional level **may be** farther and **deeper than any** body would **expect.** Foremost, **not only are bilateral relations deteriorating but ASEAN's unity is threatened.** The conflict may drift ASEAN apart, at least in terms of political unity, **affecting the progress of regional cooperation.** A number of ASEAN **leaders have expressed this concern.** During the Summit, **Philippine President Benigno Aquino said, ‘How can we have one ASEAN, one family if we have two major components who cannot solve their problems?’** After the Summit, the **Malaysian** deputy foreign minister also **expressed frustration,** blaming Thailand for not respecting the agreement previously made in Jakarta, a claim the Thai foreign ministry rejected.

Significantly, **this conflict reveals** that **ASEAN** countries **may not be ready for** the **next stage of integration.** The **sense of community is not ripe enough for any steps beyond** inter-state cooperation. Ironically, as a founding member of ASEAN, originally playing an active role in consolidating ASEAN's unity and development, **Thailand has become an obstacle to** the group's **progress.** Other founding members also **have the potential to react similarly when it comes to sovereignty issues, as the Spratly Islands show.**

This conflict could suggest that the **integration theory** based on the European model of neo-functionalism, which ASEAN has looked up to, **may not be suited to this part of the world.** More energy and resources need to be directed toward socio-cultural community building. ASEAN's shared identity needs to be fostered with a stronger foundation of mutual respect, understanding and brotherhood among Southeast Asians. With such bonds, nationalism will hardly be able to stir up hatred between neighbours and friends. **Without achieving ASEAN's socio-cultural pillar, other regional activities, including security and economic cooperation, cannot be sustained.**

The recent Summit's goals — achieving ASEAN Community by 2015, maintaining a safe and stable region, and making ASEAN active in **solving global problems** — **seem distant.** The **Thai-Cambodian conflict is not only a diplomatic embarrassment but highlights ASEAN's underlying inability to** transcend the archaic concept of sovereignty to

manage the **conflict peacefully**. Consequently, a true ASEAN Community according to ASEAN Vision 2020 may have to **stay a vision** for quite some time.

Impact Defense – Chinese Econ

Collapse doesn't lead to unrest—new leadership will push reforms, government isn't panicking

Bremmer, 13 (Ian – president of Eurasia Group, 7/19, “Will China’s slowing growth lead to unrest?”, Reuters, <http://blogs.reuters.com/ian-bremmer/2013/07/19/will-chinas-slowing-growth-lead-to-unrest/>)

Recently, it seems no developing country is safe from sudden, unexpected protests. In Brazil and Turkey, empowered middle classes pushed back against perceived governmental injustice; protests erupted, and leaders’ approval ratings dropped precipitously. In Egypt, the economic picture was as ugly as the political one, and the military’s ouster of President Mursi has fomented conflict and instability.

China may look like a candidate for the type of protests currently sweeping the developing world. Not only is a newly empowered middle class demanding better services and more accountability from government — growth has also tapered off in recent quarters. **Don't hold your breath.** At least for the time being, China is well-positioned to navigate such challenges far better than its emerging market competitors.

Let's start with the economy. For years pundits, and many Chinese government officials, thought that if China's GDP growth rate ever fell below 8 percent, it would set off an unemployment crisis that would raise the risk of social and political instability in the country. Well, China's finance minister was in Washington last week and said that the Chinese economy could handle 7 percent or even 6.5 percent growth — a lower rate than China has experienced in 23 years.

But unlike many other emerging markets, China views slower growth as a manageable challenge. The government actually recognizes that a slowdown is necessary to meet its reform and rebalancing goals, and is working now to score political points among the population by arguing that it's doing so. In particular, Beijing hopes that the slowdown will force industrial consolidation and less resource consumption, which could slow environmental degradation — which has been a major point of political vulnerability for the government. Slower growth should also calm the real estate sector, where rising prices have been a major sore point for urban Chinese. China's new leadership is betting that progress on these fronts will outweigh the downside risks they'll face as job losses tick up in the face of slower growth.

From a global perspective, there is a strong case to be made that China's slowing growth rate is actually a good sign.

The fact that Beijing hasn't just reflexively pumped capital into the system to keep growth rates up shows that it is willing to begin undertaking modest economic reforms; it is, in effect, letting bubbles shrink rather than grow until they pop. This approach is characteristic of the new leadership that took charge in March of this year: they are less risk averse and they have a more long-sighted handle on the necessary economic changes that China will have to undertake.

The new president himself is a cause for optimism. Xi Jinping has a more assertive, off-the-cuff style; he is a more spontaneous, charismatic leader than his predecessors, and early reviews in China's blogosphere suggest a favorable first impression. Xi is using this boldness to work to consolidate his support within the Communist Party.

And the extent to which he is successful will mean even more capacity for even more reform over time.

All of this doesn't mean that China's stability should be taken for granted, or that there aren't looming problems on the horizon. The very fact that China doesn't face significant near-term instability could lead to complacency and give it wiggle room to delay necessary reforms. China still needs long-term and significant economic and political transformations to get it from "developing" to "developed." It has too many changes coming to its demographics, manufacturing costs, and environmental needs to get away with ignoring them in perpetuity. (The U.S. can sympathize.) While it's a good sign that the current leadership is allowing lower growth rates in order to implement some economic reforms, thus far, all changes are happening inside the system, not to the system itself. Easy growth was the low-hanging fruit for China over the past thirty years. Now the government is reaching a bit further up the tree. But they still have a very long way to go to get to the upper branches.

China's other major threat is the stratification that any developing country has to navigate. As I've written about in the past, the growth of the Chinese economy has created a new middle class that has different demands from the largely rural population that China is still trying to lift out of poverty. In the near term the new government's tolerance for slower growth is actually positive for helping to address some of these concerns. But eventually, Beijing will have to reconcile two increasingly divergent populations. This, again, is a long-term issue. But as these issues go unaddressed, and as more Chinese become rich enough to prioritize new sorts of rights and privileges, the chances of unrest will rise.

Don't believe the idea that China is a ripe victim for this wave of developing world protests, or that China's slowing growth rate is a sign of an imminent hard landing. China's near-term picture looks surprisingly bright. But after that, the larger question still looms: Can Xi Jinping and his government handle the looming storm clouds while they are still a good way off?

Impact Defense – Free Trade

No trade impact

Fletcher, 11 (Ian Fletcher is Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, former Research Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council M.A. and B.A. from Columbia and U Chicago, "Avoid Trade War? We're Already In One!" August 29 2011 www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/avoid-trade-war-were-alre_b_939967.html)

The curious thing about the **concept of trade war** is that, **unlike actual shooting war**, it has **no historical precedent**. In fact, **there has never been a significant trade war**, "significant" in the sense of having done serious economic damage. **All history records are minor skirmishes at best.** Go ahead. Try and name a trade war. The Great Trade War of 1834? Nope. The Great Trade War of 1921? Nope Again. There isn't one. The standard example free traders give is that America's **Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930** either caused the Great Depression or made it spread around the world. But this canard **does not survive serious examination** and has **actually been denied by almost every economist who has actually researched the question in depth** – a group ranging from Paul **Krugman** on the left to Milton **Friedman** on the right. **The Depression's cause was monetary.** The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked, miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed to breathe. **Trade had nothing to do with it.** As for the charge that Smoot caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was **too small a change to have plausibly so large an effect**. For a start, it only applied to about one-third of America's trade: about 1.3 percent of our GDP. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent – not a terribly big jump. Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. **Our tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions,** and the recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide without tariff increases. As the economic historian (and free trader!) William Bernstein puts it in his book A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World, **Between 1929 and 1932, real GDP fell 17 percent worldwide, and by 26 percent in the United States, but most economic historians now believe that only a miniscule part of that huge loss of both world GDP and the United States' GDP can be ascribed to the tariff wars.** At the time of Smoot-Hawley's passage, trade volume accounted for only about 9 percent of world economic output. **Had all international trade been eliminated, and had no domestic use for the previously exported goods been found, world GDP would have fallen by the same amount -- 9 percent.** Between 1930 and 1933, worldwide trade volume fell off by one-third to one-half. Depending on how the falloff is measured, this computes to 3 to 5 percent of world GDP, and these losses were partially made up by more expensive domestic goods. Thus, the damage done could not possibly have exceeded 1 or 2 percent of world GDP -- nowhere near the 17 percent falloff seen during the Great Depression... The inescapable conclusion: contrary to public perception, Smoot-Hawley did not cause, or even significantly deepen, the Great Depression. **The oft-banded idea that Smoot-Hawley started a global trade war of endless cycles of tit-for-tat retaliation is also mythical.** According to the official State Department report on this very question in 1931: **With the exception of discriminations** in France, **the extent of discrimination against American commerce is very slight.** **By far the largest number of countries do not discriminate against the commerce of the United States in any way.** That is to say, foreign nations did indeed raise their tariffs after the passage of Smoot, but this was a broad-brush response to the Depression itself, aimed at all other foreign nations without distinction, not a retaliation against the U.S. for its own tariff. The doom-loop of spiraling **tit-for-tat retaliation** between trading partners that paralyzes free traders with fear today **simply did not happen.** "Notorious" **Smoot-Hawley is a deliberately fabricated myth, plain and simple.** We should not allow this myth to paralyze our policy-making in the present day. **There is a basic unresolved paradox at the bottom of the very concept of trade war.** If, as free traders insist, free trade is beneficial whether or not one's trading partners reciprocate, then **why would any rational nation start one?** no matter how provoked? The only way to explain this is to assume that major national governments like the Chinese and the U.S. -- **governments which, whatever bad things they may have done, have managed to hold nuclear weapons for decades without nuking each other over trivial spats -- are not players of realpolitik, but schoolchildren.** **When the moneymen** in Beijing, Tokyo, Berlin, and the other nations currently

running trade surpluses against the U.S. start to ponder the financial realpolitik of exaggerated retaliation against the U.S. for any measures we may employ to bring our trade back into balance. **they will discover the advantage is with us, not them** because they are the ones with trade surpluses to lose, not us.[¶] So our present position of weakness is, paradoxically, actually a position of strength.[¶] Likewise, China can supposedly suddenly stop buying our Treasury Debt if we rock the boat. But this would immediately reduce the value of the trillion or so they already hold -- not to mention destroying, by making their hostility overt, the fragile (and desperately-tended) delusion in the U.S. that America and China are still benign economic "partners" in a win-win economic relationship.[¶] At the end of the day, **China cannot force us to do anything** economically that we don't choose to. America is still a nuclear power. We can -- an irresponsible but not impossible scenario -- repudiate our debt to them (or stop paying the interest) as the ultimate counter-move to anything they might contemplate. More plausibly, we might simply restore the tax on the interest on foreign-held bonds that was repealed in 1984 thanks to Treasury Secretary Donald Regan.[¶] **Thus** a certain amount of back-and-forth token retaliation (and loud squealing) is indeed likely if America starts defending its interests in trade as diligently as our trading partners have been defending theirs, **but that's it. The rest of the world engages in these struggles all the time without doing much harm**; it will be no different if we join the party.

Rules and economic self interest check global trade conflict

Ikenson, 09 [Daniel, associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, "A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived," March 12, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10651]

Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, **if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates**, the average global rate of duty would double and **the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent** over five years.⁸ That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.⁹ But, **to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective**, the value of global **trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934**, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.¹⁰ So **the potential downside** today **from** what Bergsten calls "legal **protectionism**" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But **most developing countries that have room to backslide** (i.e., not China) **are not major importers**, and **thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant**. OECD countries and China account for the top two-thirds of global import value.¹¹ **Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina** (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) **is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war**. Nevertheless, **governments** are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and **have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation**. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own \$586 billion stimulus bill.¹² But **even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers**. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," **the Mexican government initiated a plan** in January **to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule**. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.¹³ And Mexico is not alone. In February, the **Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on** a wide variety of machinery and other **capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products**.¹⁴ That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the country's imports.¹⁵ Meanwhile, on February 27, **a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the** ¹⁰

member countries of the Association of South east Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints

Trade does not solve war—there's no correlation between trade and peace

Martin et al., 8 (MARTIN, MAYER, AND THOENIG 2008 (Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPIL, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.¹ Figure 1 suggests² however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

Impact Defense – SCS

No conflict in the SCS—both sides not too aggressive, experts

Thayer, 13 (Carlyle A. Thayer – Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales, May 13, “Why China and the US won’t go to war over the South China Sea”, East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/13/why-china-and-the-us-wont-go-to-war-over-the-south-china-sea/>)

China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea is challenging US primacy in the Asia Pacific.

Even before Washington announced its official policy of rebalancing its force posture to the Asia Pacific, the United States had undertaken steps to strengthen its military posture by deploying more nuclear attack submarines to the region and negotiating arrangements with Australia to rotate Marines through Darwin. Since then, the United States has deployed Combat Littoral Ships to Singapore and is negotiating new arrangements for greater military access to the Philippines.

But these developments do not presage armed conflict between China and the United States. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has been circumspect in its involvement in South China Sea territorial disputes, and the United States has been careful to avoid being entrapped by regional allies in their territorial disputes with China. Armed conflict between China and the United States in the South China Sea appears unlikely.

Another, more probable, scenario is that both countries will find a modus vivendi enabling them to collaborate to maintain security in the South China Sea. The Obama administration has repeatedly emphasised that its policy of rebalancing to Asia is not directed at containing China. For example, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander of the US Pacific Command, recently stated, ‘there has also been criticism that the Rebalance is a strategy of containment. This is not the case ... it is a strategy of collaboration and cooperation’.

No escalation – hardliners are moderating and regional coop is rising – our evidence cites high ranking Chinese officials

Buszynski, 12 (Leszek Buszynski Spring, Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, Washington quarterly spring 2012, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.—China Strategic Rivalry”)

Aware that events have moved against China since at least the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, the Hu Jintao leadership has attempted to defuse tensions over the South China Sea. The aggressive posture adopted by some Chinese military representatives and the all-too-forceful push for a sphere of influence in the Western Pacific has threatened a backlash against China and may be pushing ASEAN even closer to the United States. In the meantime, Hu Jintao’s foreign policy coordinator, State Councilor (and de facto national security advisor) Dai Bingguo, has moved to control the situation and prevent Chinese policy from being hijacked by that increasingly evident aggressive nationalism in China. In a speech at the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta on January 22, 2010, Dai declared that China was not seeking “hegemony,” that it did not want to “eject the U.S. from Asia,” and that the South China Sea would be left for future generations to resolve.⁵³ In an article in the Wall Street Journal, Dai told his U.S. audience that “China has never thought of vying for leading position [sic] in the world,” that China has cooperated with the United States over various trouble spots, and is a “partner the United States can count on.”⁵⁴ China has also moved to dampen tensions with Vietnam, its main competitor and rival in the South China Sea. Dai visited Hanoi from September 5–9, 2011 for the fifth meeting of the China–Vietnam Steering Committee on Cooperation. While there, he issued a statement that “both sides agreed to boost coordination in regional affairs and to promote China–ASEAN relations. Both sides also agreed to properly handle their dispute over the South China Sea through deep consultation to maintain friendly relations of the two countries.”⁵⁵ Soon after, Wu Bangguo, chairman of the standing committee of China’s National People’s Congress, met Vietnamese general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in Beijing and declared that China wanted to strengthen political trust with Vietnam and resolve existing problems in bilateral relations.⁵⁶ On October 15, both China and Vietnam agreed to strengthen military cooperation by increasing contacts

between high-ranking¶ officers and establishing a hotline between their respective defense ministries.¶ They also agreed to joint patrols along their land border and the Gulf of Tonkin,¶ to increase mutual visits by naval vessels, and to discuss the joint development of¶ the sea area.¶ 57¶ In Vietnam, anti-China rallies had been taking place in Hanoi¶ and Ho Chi Minh City since June 2011, but by October the protesters were¶ rounded up and the demonstrations terminated.¶ 58

Impact Defense – Warming

No extinction---mitigation and adaptation will solve

Mendelsohn, 9 (Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, "Climate Change and Economic Growth," online: <http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf>)

These statements are largely **alarmist and misleading**. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, **society's immediate behavior has an** extremely low probability **of leading to** catastrophic consequences. The **science and economics** of climate change **is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only** mild consequences. The **severe impacts** predicted by alarmists **require a century (or two)** in the case of Stern 2006) **of no mitigation**. Many of the **predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation**. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of **the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these "potential" impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long-range climate risks**. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.

***No warming --- most recent evidence**

Happer 3-27 (William, Brackett Professor of Physics – Princeton University, Fellow – American Physical Society, Member – National Academy of Sciences, "Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again", Wall Street Journal, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html?mod=googlenews_wsj)

What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost **nothing for more than 10 years**. Monthly values of the **global temperature** anomaly of the lower atmosphere, **compiled** at the University of Alabama from **NASA satellite data**, can be found at the website <http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/>. The latest (February 2012) monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere **was** minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly **less than the average** since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979. The **lack of any statistically significant warming for over a decade** has made it more difficult for the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its supporters **to demonize** the atmospheric gas **CO2** which is released when fossil fuels are burned. The burning of fossil fuels has been one reason for an increase of CO2 levels in the atmosphere to around 395 ppm (or parts per million), up from preindustrial levels of about 280 ppm. CO2 is **not a pollutant**. Life on earth **flourished** for hundreds of millions of years at **much higher CO2 levels** than we see today. Increasing CO2 levels will be a net benefit because cultivated plants grow better and are more resistant to drought at higher CO2 levels, and because **warming** and other supposedly harmful effects of CO2 **have been greatly exaggerated**. Nations with affordable energy from fossil fuels are more prosperous and healthy than those without. The direct warming due to **doubling CO2 levels** in the atmosphere can be calculated to **cause a warming of about one degree** Celsius. The IPCC computer models **predict a much larger warming**, three degrees Celsius or even more, **because they assume** changes in water vapor or clouds that supposedly amplify the direct warming from CO2. Many lines of observational evidence suggest that this **"positive feedback" also** has been **greatly exaggerated**. There has indeed been some warming, perhaps about 0.8 degrees Celsius, since the end of the so-called Little Ice Age in the early 1800s. Some of that warming has probably come from increased amounts of CO2, but the timing of the warming—much of it before CO2 levels had increased appreciably—suggests that a

substantial fraction of the warming is from natural causes that have nothing to do with [hu]mankind.

Frustrated by the lack of computer-predicted warming over the past decade, some IPCC supporters have been claiming that "extreme weather" has become more common because of more CO₂. But there is no hard evidence this is

true. After an unusually cold winter in 2011 (December 2010-February 2011) the winter of 2012 was unusually warm in the continental United States. But the winter of 2012 was bitter in Europe, Asia and Alaska. Weather conditions similar to 2012 occurred in the winter of 1942, when the U.S. Midwest was unusually warm, and when the Wehrmacht encountered the formidable forces of "General Frost" in a Russian winter not unlike the one Russians just had. Large fluctuations from warm to cold winters have been the rule for the U.S., as one can see from records kept by the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA. For example, the winters of 1932 and 1934 were as warm as or warmer than the 2011-2012 one and the winter of 1936 was much colder. Nightly television pictures of the tragic destruction from tornadoes over the past months might make one wonder if the frequency of tornadoes is increasing, perhaps due to the increasing levels of CO₂ in the atmosphere. But as one can read at Andrew Revkin's New York Times blog, dotearth, "There is no evidence of any trend in the number of potent tornadoes (category F2 and up) over the past 50 years in the United States, even as global temperatures have risen markedly." Like winter temperatures, the numbers, severity and geographical locations of tornadoes fluctuate from year-to-year in ways that are correlated with the complicated fluid flow patterns of the oceans and atmosphere, the location of the jet stream, El Niño or La Niña conditions of the tropical Pacific Oceans, etc. As long as the laws of nature exist, we will have tornadoes. But we can save many more lives by addressing the threat of tornadoes directly—for example, with improved and more widely dispersed weather radars, and with better means for warning the people of endangered areas—than by credulous support of schemes to reduce "carbon footprints," or by funding even more computer centers to predict global warming. It is easy to be confused about climate, because we are constantly being warned

about the horrible things that will happen or are already happening as a result of mankind's use of fossil fuels. But these ominous predictions are based on computer models. It is important to distinguish between what the climate is actually doing and what computer models predict. The observed response of the climate to more CO₂ is not in good agreement with model predictions.

1AR

Extn – Alt Causes

China can't resuscitate heg – media censorship, fights with US

Gao, 14

[Helen, reporter for Aljazeera based in Beijing, "China's misunderstood soft power", 12/15/13, Aljazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/china-misunderstood-soft-power-20131213132010506486.html>]

There was a time when China had more success convincing the world that it is serious about building its "soft power". It opened news bureaus in prime locations in world-class metropolises, vowing to establish a global media brand that rivals BBC and Al Jazeera. It dispatched thousands of teachers to distant continents, to staff the hundreds of government-funded Confucius Institutes that offer free Chinese-language classes to interested learners. **It bankrolled billion-dollar projects in Central and Southeast Asia, while helping to upgrade transportation and energy infrastructure in Africa**. These efforts are still continuing, **but the government's latest actions**, against foreign media outlets, **seem to be the strongest indicator yet of shifting priorities in its dealing with the world.** In November, it denied a visa to American journalist Paul Mooney, who became the second correspondent, after Melissa Chan of Al Jazeera, to be forced out of the country in the past two years. Later in the month, it conducted unannounced inspections of Bloomberg's bureaus in Beijing and Shanghai, after media reports that Bloomberg spiked a story on the financial ties between a Chinese billionaire and government officials. Most recently, there is growing concern among two dozens of reporters at Bloomberg and the New York Times, that they might not receive visas from the Chinese government in time to continue their work in China next year. Such **steps taken by the government, to punish foreign media for their China coverage, have raised international concern. They prompted US Vice President Joe Biden to warn of a possible American retaliation on his recent visit to China**. Moreover, **China's unrelenting attitude, Western observers argue, suggests that it is "losing interest in soft power"**. When the government confronts discourses it considers too threatening, it decides, as Evan Osnos in the New Yorker put it, that "being liked is less important than simply surviving."

Can't garner trust – military operations

Heydarian, 4/12/14

{Richard Javad, specialist on Asian geopolitical/ economic affairs for Aljazeera, "The end of China's soft power?" 4/12/14, Aljazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/end-china-soft-power-japan-terr-201441014352559758.html>}

"Will China invade its neighbors?" This is a question I tend to be bombarded with whenever I present lectures or attend talks on East Asian affairs. From Tehran to Tokyo, one can sense the growing anxiety towards China's international influence. **People are beginning to pay more attention to China's military budget than its trade and investment relations with the developing world**. In sanctions-hit Iran, many merchants have been complaining about China's allegedly opportunistic business practices, while industrialists and consumers have raised concerns over the macroeconomic and safety implications of cheap imports from China. In Japan, **many are worried** about their country's ability to defend itself against a rising China, with the ongoing dispute in the East China Sea **sparking a national debate** over the proposed revision of Japan's post-War pacifist constitution. In countries such as the Philippines, popular views towards China have turned **dramatically negative**, particularly due to the **ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea**. Worryingly, the antipathy towards China has assumed even an ideological colour, with many Filipinos - including some top-level officials I have come across - rehashing Cold War paranoia vis-a-vis communist countries. **In fellow communist countries such as Vietnam, China is increasingly seen in pejoratively historical terms**: as an aggressive imperial power to the north.

Extn – Heg Bad – Crowds Out US

Even if Chinese Heg is good, the shift causes transitions that lead to global wars

Khanna, '09 – Director of the Global Governance Initiative at the New America Foundation (Parag, The second world: how emerging powers are redefining global competition in the twenty-first century, p. 337-338)

Even this scenario is optimistic, for superpowers are by definition willing to encroach on the turf of others—changing the world map in the process. Much as in geology, such tectonic shifts always result in earthquakes, particularly as rising powers tread on the entrenched position of the reigning hegemon.⁵⁶ The sole exception was the twentieth century Anglo-American transition in which Great Britain and the United States were allies and shared a common culture—and even that took two world wars to complete.⁵⁷ As the relative levels of power of the three superpowers draw closer, the temptation of the number-two to preemptively knock out the king on the hill grows, as does the lead power's incentive to preventatively attack and weaken its ascending rival before being eclipsed.⁵⁸ David Hume wrote, “It is not a great disproportion between ourselves and others which produces envy, but on the contrary, a proximity.”⁵⁹ While the density of contacts among the three superpowers makes the creation of a society of states more possible than ever—all the foreign ministers have one another's mobile phone numbers—the deep differences in interests among the three make forging a “culture of peace” more challenging than ever.⁶⁰ China seas, hyperterrorism with nuclear weapons, an attack in the Gulf of Aden or the Straits of Malacca. The uncertain alignments of lesser but still substantial powers such as Russia, Japan, and India could also cause escalation. Furthermore, America's foreign lenders could pull the plug to undermine its grand strategy, sparking economic turmoil, political acrimony, and military tension. War brings profit to the military-industrial complex and is always supported by the large patriotic camps on all sides. Yet the notion of a Sino-U.S. rivalry to lead the world is also premature and simplistic, for in the event of their conflict, Europe would be the winner, as capital would flee to its sanctuaries. These great tensions are being played out in the world today, as each superpower strives to attain the most advantageous position for itself, while none are powerful enough to dictate the system by itself. Global stability thus hangs between the bookends Raymond Aron identified as “peace by law” and “peace by empire,” the former toothless and the latter prone to excess.⁶¹ Historically, successive iterations of balance of power and collective security doctrines have evolved from justifying war for strategic advantage into building systems to avoid it, with the post-Napoleonic “Concert of Europe” as the first of the modern era.⁶² Because it followed rules, it was itself something of a societal system.* Even where these attempts at creating a stable world order have failed—including the League of Nations after World War I—systemic learning takes place in which states (particularly democracies) internalize the lessons of the past into their institutions to prevent history from repeating itself.⁶³ Toynbee too viewed history as progressive rather than purely cyclical, a wheel that not only turns around and around but also moves forward such that Civilization (with a big C) could become civilized.⁶⁴ But did he “give too much credit to time's arrows and not enough to time's cycle”?⁶⁵ Empires and superpowers usually promise peace but bring wars.⁶⁶ The time to recognize the current revolutionary situation is now—before the next world war.⁶⁷

That said, US still is key – Heg prevents great power wars, regional instability and prolif

- provides leverage for de-escalation
- creates alliances
- bolsters deterrence
- checks anarchy

Brooks 13

[Stephen, Associate Professor of Government (Dartmouth), M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science (Yale), written in collaboration with Ikenberry and Wohlforth,

“Don't Come Home America: the Case Against Retrenchment, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51,

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3703_Brooks%20Wohlforth%20Ikenberry.pdf]

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a **far more dangerous** global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States' overseas presence gives it the leverage to

restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, **its core alliance commitments also deter states** with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners **more secure**, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power **dampens the baleful effects** of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the **scariest portrayal** of the war-prone world that would emerge **absent the "American Pacifier"** is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts **dangerous multipolar regions** replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale **great power war**.

Global nuclear war

Brooks 13 – Stephen G., Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul and William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, "Lean Forward", Foreign Affairs, January / February, 92(1)

They are wrong. In making their case, **advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs** of the current grand strategy and **understate its benefits**. In fact, the **budgetary savings** of lowering the United States' international profile **are debatable**, and **there is little evidence to suggest** that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars. The **benefits of deep engagement**, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. **security commitments reduce competition** in **key regions** and act as a **check against potential rivals**. They help **maintain** an open **world economy** and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the **U.S.** to **secure cooperation for** combating a **wide range of global threats**. Were the **U.S.** to cede its global leadership role, it **would forgo** these proven upsides while exposing itself to the **unprecedented downsides** of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential. AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has **warned of** the country's "**ballooning budget deficits**" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement—numbers that are hard to pin down. If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around \$900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an **"offshore balancing"** strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The **savings** these approaches would yield **are less clear**, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the **savings would be modest at best**, since the **countries hosting U.S. forces** usually **cover** a large portion of the **basing costs**. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad. The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such **high levels of spending aren't needed** to maintain an engaged global posture. **Spending** skyrocketed after 9/11, but it **has already begun to fall** back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under \$500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies. Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed non-war spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs. UNBALANCED **One such alleged cost** of the current grand strategy **is that**, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, **it "prompts states to balance** against U.S. power however they can." Yet **there is no evidence** that **countries have banded together in anti-American alliances** or tried to match the **U.S.** military capacity on their own-- or that they will do so in the future. Indeed, **it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing**. Unlike past hegemony, the **U.S.** **is geographically isolated**, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it **faces no contiguous great-power rivals** that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, **any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military**. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its **security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals**. Because the

United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point. If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback—especially during the administration of George W.

Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the United States by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting.

Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice

only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the United States benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several

Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms. Another argument for retrenchment holds that the United States will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemony and accelerate its own decline.

In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes—infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on—that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would. The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued

hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them—a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use

their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear

relationship between military expenditures and economic decline. To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around a quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense—a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its

defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global

commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy. Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels—just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance. LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and

critics of an expansive grand strategy worry that the United States might get dragged into unnecessary wars. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts—a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance

commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake. History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is nearly

impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World

War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment. If anything, alliances reduce the risk of getting pulled into a conflict. In East Asia, the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were

designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against

adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the

U.S. Taiwan relationship. After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence. For many advocates of retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes. Furthermore, they contend, the United States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the UN, famously asked Colin

Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?" If the U.S.

military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like

Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would

not disappear. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations. Besides, the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand

strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war. Likewise, continuing the current grand strategy in no way

condemns the United States to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations—what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing. KEEPING THE PEACE Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a

dangerous conflict. The United States security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could

peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington—notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East—but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world's key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence of regional hegemonies. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony—China—and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred—convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda

believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' **geopolitical dominance** also **helps keep the U.S. dollar** in place as **the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits** on the country, such as a greater **ability to borrow money**. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU's dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. **Shirking** that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of **international cooperation**. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the **U**_{nited} **S**_{tates}. In order to counter **transnational threats**, such as **terrorism**, **piracy**, **organized crime**, **climate change**, and **pandemics**, states have to work together and take collective action. But **cooperation does not come about effortlessly**, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' **military efforts** to promote stability and its **broad leadership make it easier** for Washington to **launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests**. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. **U.S. alliances** are about security first, but they also **provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues**. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The **benefits** of these communication channels **are especially pronounced when it comes to** fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as **terrorism and pandemics**. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes—a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. **There is little evidence that the U**_{nited} **S**_{tates} **would save much money switching to a smaller global posture**. Nor is the **current strategy** self-defeating: it **has not provoked** the formation of **counterbalancing coalitions** or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. **Nor will it condemn the U**_{nited} **S**_{tates} **to foolhardy wars** in the future. What **the strategy does** do is help **prevent** the **outbreak of conflict** in the world's **most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier**. Charting **a different course would threaten all these benefits**. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were **American leaders to choose retrenchment**, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. **The results could well be disastrous**.

Extn – Heg Bad – Spurs Sino/US War

As China grows more powerful, it is becoming more bellicose

Mosher, 13

[Mosher, president of the Population Research Institute and author of “Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World” (Encounter, 2000), “China’s approaching hegemony”, 7/12/13, Washington Times, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/12/chinas-approaching-hegemony/?page=all>]

Everywhere we look, we see evidence of China’s increasing aggressiveness. Since September, China has been vigorously asserting its new claim to the Senkaku Islands by sending a constant stream of naval vessels and planes to harass Japanese patrol boats there. Not only that, a top Chinese general has questioned the legitimacy of Japanese claims not just to the tiny Senkakus, but also to the entire Ryukyu Island chain, including Okinawa with its U.S. military bases. In May, Chinese troops intruded nearly 12 miles into Indian territory, withdrawing only after India agreed to withdraw its own troops from the area. The high-altitude border dispute, which has been simmering since the Sino-Indian War of 1962, involves territory the size of Greece with a population of more than 1 million. Then there is the South China Sea, where China has been aggressively asserting its sovereignty over the 1.4 million-square-mile stretch of open ocean. In November, Beijing announced that Chinese authorities would board and seize control of foreign ships that “illegally enter” the area that it claims is part of the province of Hainan. Seizing ships in international waters is an act of war under international law. China also has sowed seeds of conflict by continuing to expand its military presence in the area. Last year, it seized the Scarborough Shoal, which lies off the coast of the Philippines. When that country protested, China reacted by saying that the Philippines’ claims were illegal and that it never would agree to international arbitration over the shoal or any other claims. In January, it issued a map that for the first time precisely delineated its grandiose claim. What the map shows is the largest attempted land grab since World War II. It is as if Nazi Germany had claimed the entire Mediterranean Sea as sovereign territory. On it goes. Nearly every month, China is making a new territorial claim or bullying its neighbors over an existing one. Worse yet, it is defining these claims, like its long-standing claims to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, as “core interests” that are vital to national survival and are emphatically not up for negotiation.